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Abstract. The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly 
consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the 
residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. 
According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) 
intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued 
residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people 
intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few 
realize that by remaining they are consenting to the state’s lawful actions. 
Moreover, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the 
state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if 
any people can be considered to have consented through their 
residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory 




An important strand of social contract theory says that we adults tacitly consent 
to a state’s lawful actions just by residing within its borders. Intuitively, the idea 
is that if we did not agree with these actions, we would have picked up and left, 
so that those of us who remain may be taken to have consented to them, even 
though we may never have bothered to make that consent explicit. For 
convenience, I will call this the residence theory. 
The main idea behind this theory goes back at least to Plato (Crito, 51c–53a) 
and gets picked up much later by early modern social contract theorists such as 
Locke (1689: §119) and Rousseau (1762: 4.2). Recently it has been defended in 
one form or another by a few philosophers, including Beran (1977, 1987), Boxill 
(1993), Otsuka (2003: 89–113), and Davis (2017). But for the most part it has 
fallen on hard times. Due primarily to the criticisms of John Simmons (1979: 57–
100; 1993), theories of political authority based on actual consent, including the 
residence theory, have almost universally been abandoned by political 
philosophers. As Klosko (2005: 122) notes: “In discussions of political obligation, 
it is now generally recognized that a workable theory cannot be based on 
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consent. Adequate numbers of people have not consented to their 
governments, either expressly or tacitly.”1 
Consent theorists generally agree that in order for an agent S’s φ-ing to effect 
consent, at least three conditions must be met: 
1. S’s φ-ing must be voluntary. 
2. S must know that by φ-ing she consents to the actions of some authority; 
that is, she must know both that she consents and, at some level of 
generality, to what she is consenting. 
3. In φ-ing, S must intend to consent (or to communicate consent) to those 
actions. 
We may call these, respectively, the liberty condition, the knowledge condition, 
and the intention condition. 
Given these constraints, my continued residence can effect consent only if (i) 
I remain within the state voluntarily, (ii) I know that I am thereby consenting to 
certain actions of the state, and (iii) I intend thereby to consent or to 
communicate consent to these actions. According to the critics, however, all 
three conditions raise difficulties for the residence theory. For in the first place, 
most citizens who remain in the country in which they were raised neither knew 
that they were thereby consenting to the government’s actions, nor intended 
thereby to consent. Nor did they intend thereby to communicate their consent. 
In most cases, a person’s continued residence meets neither the knowledge nor 
the intention conditions. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the critics 
maintain that those who remain in a state rarely do so voluntarily because 
various obstacles make it difficult if not impossible for them to leave, and insofar 
as they are unable to do otherwise, their remaining in the state is not free or 
voluntary. Hence, in most cases, a person’s continued residence fails to satisfy 
the liberty condition as well. (I call this the liberty objection.) 
These objections are typically regarded as fairly quick and decisive 
refutations of the residence theory. Critics usually state them briefly, discard the 
theory, and move on. Quick though they may be, however, it seems to me that 
they are anything but decisive. In fact, I think they fail to cast any serious doubt 
on the residence theory. In what follows, I will attempt to show why by arguing 
 
1 Discussions of our normative relations with the state often focus on the issue of 
political obligation, that is, properly speaking, our duty to obey the law, or more 
broadly, what we owe to the state. On my view, such obligations always arise 
from an act of promising, whereas the act of consenting grants to another some 
authority and thus, in the political case, concerns what the state is entitled to do 
with respect to us. Although this essay focuses nominally on consent and 
political authority, I hold that (subject to the qualifications issued in §§3–4 below) 
our continued residence within the bounds of a state constitutes both a 
consenting and a promising act, so that it underwrites both the state’s authority 
over us and our obligation to obey the laws. 
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for the following claims, taking the three conditions and the corresponding 
objections in reverse order. 
First, there is no general requirement of intention for consent: legitimate, 
authority-granting consent requires neither that one intend to consent nor that 
one intend to communicate consent, and in cases of passive consent, whereby 
one consents through some form of inaction, one need not even intend the 
consenting inaction (§2). 
Second, regarding knowledge, consent requires not that the agent actually 
know that and to what she is consenting, but only that there be a reasonable 
expectation that she would know such things—an expectation that does 
generally obtain in the case of residence within a state (§3). 
Third, so long as we are willing to grant that free or voluntary action is 
compatible with the inability to do otherwise, as most philosophers believe, then 
we have good reason to believe that continued residence does widely satisfy 
the liberty condition, at least in the case of liberal democracies (§4). 
In view of these points, I conclude that none of these objections to the 
residence theory succeed. At least for those who are not committed 
incompatibilists, that theory remains a viable option for explaining the broad 
(though not universal) political authority of many contemporary states. 
 
2. The Intention Condition 
Many critics of the residence theory maintain that consent requires an element 
of intention. Typically the idea is that consent presupposes an intention to 
consent.2 They then object that few if any people who remain within the 
boundaries of a state intend thereby to consent to anything, least of all the state’s 
actions. Hence, it follows that continued residence typically fails to satisfy the 
intention condition, and thus typically fails to be a consenting act, in which case 
the residence theory fails as a theory of the general consent of a people to the 
actions of a state. 
In reality, however, consent does not always require the intention to 
consent.3 This may be illustrated with an example. On a recent visit to Barbados, 
I encountered a prominent sign hanging outside the port terminal, which read: 
“ENTERING THIS FACILITY IS DEEMED VALID CONSENT TO SCREENING OR 
INSPECTION.” As I approached the terminal, I saw and understood the sign’s 
meaning; I then proceeded to enter the terminal voluntarily. So both the 
knowledge and liberty conditions were satisfied. Furthermore, it seems clear 
that in knowingly and voluntarily entering the terminal, I did indeed consent to 
 
2 See, e.g., Flathman (1972: 220); Simmons (1979: 77); Simmons (1993: 226–28); 
Lefkowitz (2006: 579); Horton (2010: 29); Kleinig (2010: 17–20); Simmons (2010: 
306, 317–18). 
3 For a related but different response to this objection, see Boxill (1993: 82–88). 
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being screened or inspected. But at no point did I intend to consent to such 
actions. To be sure, I did intend to enter the country of Barbados; and for that 
reason I also intended to enter the terminal. These were my aims or goals. But I 
did not intend to consent to being screened or inspected, even though I knew 
that by entering the terminal, I would be consenting to such actions. To intend 
something in this sense is to have it as an aim or goal of one’s action. But at no 
point was it one of my aims or goals to be screened or inspected. Rather, I 
intended only to enter the terminal, and thereby to gain access to the streets of 
Bridgetown. Nonetheless, because I entered the terminal voluntarily, and knew 
that doing so would be considered a consenting act, it seems clear that I thereby 
consented to being searched by the authorities. Hence, consenting does not 
require the intention to consent. 
Suppose the authorities had attempted to search me. Had the sign been 
missing, and had there been no way for me to know that entering the terminal 
was considered a consenting act, I would have had a valid complaint: I did not 
know, and could not have been expected to know, that entering the terminal 
was considered a consenting act. In such a case, the knowledge condition would 
not have been satisfied, and so there would have been no consent. Similarly, 
had I been forced to enter the terminal against my will, the liberty condition 
would not have been satisfied, and clearly there would have been no consent. 
But suppose that I knowingly and voluntarily entered the terminal, but objected 
that the authorities had no right to search me because at no point did I form the 
intention to consent to such a search. It seems clear that such an objection would 
fall flat, and rightly so. Whether I intended to consent is beside the point. What 
matters is only that I voluntarily performed what I knew would be a consenting 
act. 
In his most careful treatment of this issue, Simmons (1993: 226–30) reiterates 
the requirement that consent must be given intentionally, but then issues a 
significant qualification: “It is hard to deny that there might be some cases where 
it seems possible to give binding consent without intending to do so or being 
aware of the consequences of our act” (Simmons, 1993: 229). He gives the 
example of man who orders food in a restaurant, but due to ignorance or 
confusion about how restaurants work, fails to realize that he is expected to pay 
for the food. Simmons grants that if the man’s ignorance or confusion were 
excusable, then his ordering would not have bound him to pay for the food. But 
he adds that if the man’s ignorance or confusion were inexcusable—if he should 
have known that ordering food in a restaurant is a binding act—then the man 
would have in fact committed himself to paying, even though he did not intend 
to make any such commitment. Thus, even Simmons admits that binding 
consent can occur in the absence of any intention to consent. 
I agree. The example of the willfully or at least inexcusably ignorant man who 
orders food in a restaurant nicely illustrates the possibility of consenting (or 
obligating oneself) in the absence of any intention to consent. But it should be 
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noted that this is not the only kind of case in which binding (or authority-
granting) consent does not require the intention to consent. As my Barbados 
example shows, this can happen even when the missing intent is not due to 
some (inexcusable) ignorance or confusion. I know full well that entering the 
terminal is understood to be a consenting act, and that by performing this act I 
succeed in consenting. Yet I lack the intention to consent. Even in cases in which 
there is no inexcusable ignorance or confusion, then, the intention condition is 
not a necessary condition for consent. 
Another kind of case that buttresses my point is that of the insincere 
consenter. Suppose the police, finding me at the scene of a crime, ask me 
whether I would consent to a search of my home. In the hopes of not raising 
further suspicion, I say that I do indeed consent to such a search. But even 
though I say this, I do not in fact intend to consent to any such search; rather, I 
intend only to feign consent. In fact, I have every intention of turning the police 
away if they appear at my house. My expression of consent is insincere. But 
notice that whether I intend to consent is irrelevant to whether I actually do 
consent. What matters is that I knowingly and willingly perform an action of a 
kind that serves to effect consent in that context. My action is genuinely 
consenting, even though I do not intend thereby to consent. Indeed, I may even 
have intended not to consent. But that is beside the point. In knowingly and 
willingly signaling my consent, I thereby succeed in consenting, even if that was 
not my real intent. 
The case of the insincere consenter presents a problem for proponents of 
the intention condition because it suggests that a person who merely feigns 
consent, and thus does not intend to consent, nonetheless succeeds in 
consenting. In a recent updating of his view, Simmons (2010: 317) appears to 
address this problem by recasting the intention condition. He notes that “Just as 
an insincere promise may nonetheless bind us to perform as promised, so 
consent that intentionally and successfully communicates our undertaking of 
obligation, even in the absence of any intention on our part to honor our 
consent, may (and typically does) still bind us.” Thus, he suggests that what 
consent requires is not so much the intention to consent as the intention to 
communicate consent: “we must intend for our actions to communicate (and 
must succeed in communicating) to others that we thereby undertake new 
obligations with respect to them and/or convey to them new rights.”4 On this 
view, there is no difficulty in explaining how the insincere consenter could 
nonetheless consent without intending to do so: for she still intends to 
communicate consent, as in the example of the previous paragraph, in which I 
misrepresent my wishes to the police in order not to raise suspicion. Perhaps 
 
4 Emphasis in original. Lefkowitz (2006: 579) also requires the intent to 
communicate consent, but he appears to require this in addition to the intention 
to consent, not instead of it. 
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what consent really requires with respect to intent, then, is the intention to 
communicate consent. 
The problem with this move is that consent does not require the intent to 
communicate consent either. Consider again the Barbados example. I 
understand that by entering the terminal, I consent to being searched. But my 
intention in entering the terminal is not to communicate that consent, any more 
than it was to consent. To the contrary, my intention in entering the terminal is 
to get to the other side, to access the city, and so forth. I understand that by 
entering the terminal I am signaling to the authorities my willingness to be 
searched; but that is not my intention. It is not my aim or goal to signal this to 
the authorities, even though I know that I am doing so. Thus, consent does not 
require that one intend to communicate one’s consent. As long as the 
consenting act is performed voluntarily, and in a sufficiently informed way, then 
the agent has in fact consented. 
I have argued that consent requires neither the intention to consent nor the 
intention to communicate consent. So far as this is correct, the fact that citizens 
who remain within the boundaries of a state typically do not intend thereby 
either to consent or to communicate consent does not prevent their continued 
residence from effecting consent. However, there remains a further concern. For 
one might still hold that consent must be intentional in the minimal sense that 
one must intend to perform the consenting act. This is different from saying that 
one must intend to consent or to communicate consent. The thought is merely 
that one must intend to perform whatever action happens to be the consenting 
act. In the Barbados example, the idea would be that I must intend to enter the 
terminal in order for my doing so to effect consent. So understood, the intention 
condition might still present a problem for the residence theory; for it might be 
supposed that few people who remain within the state in which they were raised 
ever intend to remain there. Perhaps most such people do not give the matter 
of leaving or staying any serious thought, but merely remain as a matter of 
inertia, without consciously intending to do so. If that were true, then continued 
residence might still typically fail to satisfy the intention condition for consent. 
It is far from obvious that most adults living within a state have not at some 
point intended to be or to remain there. But even if that is the case, this lack of 
intention is not a problem for the residence theory. For the requirement that one 
intend to perform the consenting act arguably applies only in cases of active 
consent—consent given through action—and not in cases of passive consent, that 
is, consent given through inaction. To see why, consider a variation on an 
example given by Michael Huemer (2013: 23). Suppose I throw a party at my 
house and you are in attendance. As the night wears on, I announce that those 
in attendance may stay as late as they like, but that anyone who stays past ten 
o’clock consents to me charging their credit card to help cover cleaning 
expenses. You hear this announcement and process it, but being engrossed in 
conversation, give the matter no further thought and soon lose track of time. 
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10:30 rolls around, and I ask for your credit card number. Recalling my 
announcement, you protest that even though you knew this condition was in 
force, you did not intend to stay past ten, indeed even intended to leave before 
ten, and thus did not really consent to me charging your card. Few will deny, I 
think, that under such circumstances, the fact that you did not intend to perform 
the consenting act—did not intend to stay past ten—in no way undercuts my right 
to charge your card. It is really quite beside the point whether you formed the 
intention to stay past ten or not. What matters is only that you willingly and (in a 
sense to be clarified below) knowingly stayed past ten: no one forced you to stay 
or stopped you from leaving, and you knew this condition was in force, even 
though you temporarily lost sight of this fact due to inattention. In other words, 
what matters is only that the knowledge and liberty conditions were satisfied. 
In cases of active consent, whether express or tacit, it is surely true that one 
must intend to perform the consenting act: I must intend to enter the terminal, 
to raise my hand, to sign on the dotted line, and so forth.5 In cases of passive 
consent, however, the party example suggests that one need not intend to 
refrain from acting in order for one’s inaction to effect consent. And this is good 
news for the residence theory; for remaining within a state is most plausibly 
viewed as passive rather than active, as a form of inaction rather than action. 
Hence, it follows that one need not intend to remain within a state in order for 
one’s remaining to effect consent. All that is required is that one consent 
knowingly and with liberty.  
If these points are right, then intention is not after all required for consent: 
one need not intend either to consent or to communicate consent, and in cases 
of passive consent, such as continued residence, one need not even intend to 
forbear from acting. As far as intention is concerned, then, there is no difficulty 
in supposing that all rational, adult residents within a state have consented to 
the state’s authority through their residence. 
 
3. The Knowledge Condition 
Many critics also contend that the residence theory fails because a person’s 
continued residence rarely meets the knowledge condition. As I have 
formulated that condition, it says that an agent S’s φ-ing can effect consent only 
if S knows that in φ-ing she consents to certain actions on the part of some other 
agent, in this case the state. That is, S must know both that she consents and, at 
 
5 The defining mark of tacit consent is not that it is passive, as some have 
suggested (Plamenatz, 1968: 8; Simmons, 1979: 80; Horton, 2010: 29), but that 
it is given through actions (or inactions) that do not have the conventionally 
established purpose of effecting consent, but which nonetheless serve that 
purpose in a given social context (cf. Simmons, 2010: 315–16). 
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some level of generality, to what she is consenting. The problem this raises for 
the residence theory is that very few people who remain in a country once 
reaching the age of consent know or realize that they are thereby consenting to 
the authority of the government. And since the residence theory is supposed to 
explain how the state comes to have authority over most if not all of its citizens, 
this is a serious problem. 
I do not know whether most people realize or know that by remaining within 
the boundaries of the state, they are consenting to the state’s authority. Perhaps 
most, perhaps even the vast majority, do not. But in any case I will not challenge 
this point. I want to pursue a different line of reply. 
Some theorists have observed that what consent requires with respect to 
knowledge, properly speaking, is not that one knows that one is consenting, but 
that one not be blamelessly ignorant that one is consenting. That is, it must be 
that the person knows, or least should have known—could reasonably be 
expected to know—that she was consenting through her action.6 In order to 
refute the residence theory, then, it is not enough to show that most citizens do 
not realize that their continued residence is a consenting act. What must be 
shown is that they could not reasonably have been expected to realize this. 
In his defense of the residence theory, Beran (1977: 270) exploits this very 
point. He claims that “Adults in contemporary states with universal education” 
do in fact know each of the following: 
1. In remaining within the territory of a state when one comes of age one 
accepts full membership in it. 
2. In accepting membership in a rule-governed association (in the absence 
of coercion, deception, etc.) one puts oneself under an obligation to 
obey its rules. 
3. The state is a rule-governed association. 
He then notes that these three claims jointly entail that 
4. In remaining within the territory of a state when one comes of age (in the 
absence of coercion, deception, etc.) one puts oneself under an 
obligation to obey its rules. 
Finally, he claims that even though many citizens may not make the inference 
from (1)–(3) to (4), and thus may not know (4), that does not prevent consent from 
coming off, because their ignorance of (4) may well be negligent: “It may well 
be negligent, since people should consider what moral significance there is in 
their new status and their new rights” (270). In other words, they should make 
the inference from (1)–(3) to (4). 
Simmons (1993: 230–32) criticizes this reply by questioning whether ordinary 
citizens really do know (1)–(3). He notes that “Beran merely asserts that ordinary 
 
6 For helpful discussion of the details here, though in the context of moral 




persons understand these matters” and claims that “it would seem peculiar (or 
even unreasonable) for ordinary persons to hold the views ascribed to them by 
Beran” (Simmons, 1993: 231). For they do not act as if they believe that coming 
of age marks a sharp break in the course of their political lives, a break at which 
they attain full membership in a rule-governed association. Consequently, 
Simmons concludes, “the claim that the ignorance of such persons is ‘negligent’ 
seems ridiculous.” 
For my part, I fail to see how citizens of the sort Beran has in mind could fail 
to grasp claims (2) and (3). With few exceptions, everyone knows, in effect, that 
the state is a rule-governed association, and it is widely understood that 
accepting membership in such an association entails an obligation to obey its 
rules. With respect to (1), however, Simmons has a point: one may reasonably 
doubt whether ordinary citizens, even ones with a “universal education”, know 
or believe that a person accepts full membership in the state by remaining within 
its boundaries as an adult. As it stands, therefore, Beran’s reply falls short. 
Beran is nonetheless on the right track. Given that what consent requires is 
not knowledge but a reasonable expectation of knowledge, the salient question 
is not whether most ordinary adults actually know that by remaining within the 
state, they are consenting to the state’s authority. The salient question is whether 
they should know this, that is, whether ignorance of this point is excusable. I want 
to suggest that it is not. 
Consider that most educated adults well understand that when they travel to 
another country or even just to another jurisdiction, they are submitting to the 
authority of the relevant government. They understand that they are subject to 
the laws of that jurisdiction, even if they do not know the precise content of those 
laws. They understand that if they are caught breaking a law, they cannot expect 
to get off by pleading ignorance or by noting that they are only visitors. But if it 
is true that these points are widely grasped by educated adults, then it should 
also be widely understood that by freely remaining in their home country (or 
jurisdiction), they are likewise consenting to the authority of that government. It 
is a small step indeed from the claim “In willingly entering another jurisdiction, I 
thereby consent to its authority” to the claim “By willingly remaining in this 
jurisdiction, I thereby consent to its authority.” Because remaining is passive, 
whereas entering is active, many people may fail to make this inference, and the 
latter claim may never distinctly occur to them. But it would be irrational to 
believe the former and not also believe the latter. Hence, most citizens could 
reasonably be expected to know that their continued residence constitutes 
consent. In Beran’s terms, most citizens could be expected to know (1), and 
given that they also know (2) and (3), they could reasonably be expected to know 
(4). Any rational, well-educated citizen who fails to know this is therefore 
inexcusably ignorant. 
Properly construed, then, the knowledge condition can be considered to be 
widely satisfied by rational adults who continue to reside within the borders of a 
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state. Even though they may not actually realize that their remaining is a 
consenting act—the thought may have never occurred to them—the fact remains 
that they should have realized this, could reasonably be expected to realize this. 
And that is all that consent requires with respect to knowledge. 
Because it generally satisfies the knowledge condition, the case of continued 
residence also provides what Simmons (2010: 316) calls a “clear choice 
situation” (cf. Simmons, 1993; 2001: 166–171, 177–178). According to Simmons, 
a case of express consent “creates its own context by positively invoking 
standing linguistic (or other) conventions for giving consent.” But in cases of tacit 
consent, where consent is given by a kind of action or inaction that lacks this 
conventionally established context-creating quality, that context must be 
provided. In my Barbados example, this context is provided by the sign: merely 
walking into a building, we might think, even a port terminal, does not normally 
constitute a consenting act, and so the sign is necessary in order to establish the 
significance of entering the building in that context. This is what Simmons means 
by a clear choice situation: it must be clear to the agent that a certain action (or 
inaction) will have such-and-such implications in this situation. Now in the case 
of continued residence, it might be thought that there is no clear choice 
situation, because there is nothing analogous to the sign which informs people 
that by remaining, they are consenting to the state’s actions, and that they can 
refrain from consenting only by leaving. But if I am right that most rational adults 
could reasonably be expected to know these facts even in the absence of some 
explicit statement of them—even in the absence of something analogous to the 
sign—then we do have a clear choice situation. It is clear, or at least should be 
clear, that their continued residence expresses and thus effects consent, that 
they could refrain from consenting only by leaving, and so forth. 
 
4. The Liberty Condition 
Having dealt with the intention and knowledge conditions, I now come to what 
has traditionally been viewed as the Achilles heel of the residence theory: 
namely, that one’s continued residence typically fails to satisfy the requirement 
that a consenting act be voluntary or free. This objection, the liberty objection, 
was first and most famously articulated by Hume (1748: 283): 
Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince which 
one might leave, every individual has given a tacit consent to his 
authority, and promised him obedience; it may be answered, that such 
an implied consent can only have place where a man imagines that the 
matter depends on his choice. [...] Can we seriously say, that a poor 
peasant or artisan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows 
no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by the small 
wages which he acquires? We may as well assert that a man, by 
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remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; 
though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the 
ocean and perish, the moment he leaves her. 
The key word here is “choice”. According to Hume, there can be an implied or 
tacit consent to the state’s authority only if the consenting action or inaction—in 
this case, one’s continued residence—is a matter of choice, that is, free choice. 
But most of us, at least, do not really have a choice about whether to stay or leave 
the country, because of the considerable barriers to exit—financial, cultural, 
familial, and so forth. For most of us, then, our continued residence cannot be 
construed as a form of consent, because it is not free: we have no choice but to 
stay.7 
This objection has been echoed many times over the years, and continues 
to be urged today by critics of the residence theory. Simmons (Wellman and 
Simmons, 2005: 118) is typical: 
Mere continued residence (Locke’s famous suggestion) or 
nonresistance, for instance, while widely practiced, are in fact remarkably 
bad candidates for acts of consent to obey. For many citizens there are 
few acceptable options to remaining in their states and obeying (most) 
law, and for most persons active resistance to the state is in effect 
impossible. And for none of us is there any option [i.e., alternative] to 
living in some state or other, all of which make (at least) the same core 
demands on us. These facts raise serious doubts about the voluntariness 
of any widely performed acts that might be alleged to be binding acts of 
political consent. And in the absence of an adequate level of 
voluntariness, such acts simply cannot be counted as grounding moral 
duties to obey the law.8 
The point here is the same basic one raised by Hume, though Simmons speaks 
in terms of consent being voluntary rather than free.9 The bottom line is that for 
most us, our continued residence is not voluntary because we are not able to 
 
7 Hume can also be read as making the point that continued residence often 
fails to satisfy the knowledge condition. For he says that “such an implied 
consent can have place only where the man imagines that the matter depends 
on his choice” (emphasis mine), and it would seem to be an implication of the 
remainder of the passage that the poor peasant or artisan cannot be supposed 
to imagine any such thing. 
8 For other recent statements of this objection, see, e.g., Woozley (1979: 106–8); 
Simmons (1979: 98–99; 1993: 233–48); Higgins (2004: 105–9); Klosko (2005: 
125); Lefkowitz (2006: 580); Wolff (2006: 42–43); Horton (2010: 34); Knowles 
(2010: 109–10); Huemer (2013: 25–35). 
9 Some philosophers, e.g., Locke (1690: 2.21.8), distinguish between the free 




leave the country in which we reside. And even if we could, we probably could 
not escape the laws of some country or other, all of which make “the same core 
demands on us”. Hence, our continued residence is not voluntary. And as 
consent must be voluntary, our continued residence cannot be supposed to 
effect consent.10 
Hume and Simmons appear to be arguing that our remaining within the 
bounds of a state is not free or voluntary simply because we have no choice but 
to stay. If that were the objection, though, it would at the very least stand in need 
of considerable elaboration, since it would rest on the notoriously controversial 
and widely rejected principle that free (or voluntary) action requires the ability 
to do otherwise. In one of his more recent discussions, however, Simmons 
(2010) offers a more nuanced and promising version of this objection. After 
quoting Hume, he makes the usual point that our remaining cannot be voluntary 
if leaving is not a viable option: 
Hume suggests that for many (especially the poor) emigration is not 
really a viable option, so that the “choice” being presented constitutes 
no genuine choice at all. This indicates that the voluntariness condition 
for binding consent cannot be satisfied for the case of continued 
residence as an act of political consent. (Simmons, 2010: 320–321) 
But it’s clear that the usual point is not quite what Simmons has in mind. For just 
a few pages earlier, he grants that one’s remaining can be free even if one 
cannot leave: 
While we may, of course, freely consent to an arrangement even where 
we have no viable options to doing so (just as a person whose exits have 
been secretly blocked may nonetheless freely choose to remain in her 
home for the evening), “consent” given only because of the absence of 
options—especially where others have removed those options precisely 
in order to compel consent—typically does not bind us. (Simmons, 2010: 
318, emphasis in original) 
As this passage makes clear, Simmons’ point is not that our remaining fails to be 
voluntary merely because we have no alternative; his claim is rather that our 
remaining fails to be voluntary if we remain only because we have no alternative, 
especially if these alternatives have been removed by others in order to force us 
to remain. Furthermore, in the slightly later passage where he states the liberty 
objection, he goes on to say, immediately following the words quoted above: 
Even if consent is not exactly coerced by the state in requiring a choice 
between consent or emigration, it seems nonetheless true that in doing 
so the state counts as exploiting the vulnerability of those who find 
themselves within its claimed territories and thus rendering their choice 
 
10 For other responses to this objection, see Beran (1977: 166–68; 1993: 493–98; 




insufficiently voluntary to count as binding. (2010: 321; cf. Simmons, 
1993: 240–241) 
This adds the idea that our remaining fails to be voluntary not just because of 
the absence of options, but because the absence of options gives rise to a 
vulnerability that the state exploits in forcing us to choose between consent or 
emigration. So even if we are not coerced, we are exploited, and that is enough 
to render our residence insufficiently voluntary. 
So what about this more nuanced version of the liberty objection? First of all, 
Simmons is quite right that if we remain within a state only because we have no 
alternatives, then our remaining is not voluntary. For our remaining is voluntary 
only if we want to remain, and if we want to remain, then we are not doing so 
only because we cannot leave. Put otherwise, if we remain only because we 
cannot leave, then it follows that we do not want to remain: we want to leave but 
cannot. In such a case, we remain against our will, and our remaining is thus 
involuntary.11 
Consider Locke’s well-known example, akin to Simmons’ example of the 
person whose exits have been secretly blocked, of the man who awakes to find 
himself in a locked room, accompanied by someone he “longs to see and speak 
with” (Locke, 1690: 2.21.10).12 Since the man is “glad to find himself in so 
desirable Company” and “prefers his stay to going away,” Locke concludes that 
the man stays willingly, that is, voluntarily, even though he is unable to leave. 
(Those who prefer Frankfurt cases may imagine that the door is unlocked, but 
that an intervener stands ready to lock it if the man attempts to leave.) What this 
appears to show is that the man’s staying is voluntary just in case the man wants 
to stay. More generally, it appears to show that one acts voluntarily just in case 
one does what one wants. As long as the man prefers staying over leaving, his 
staying is voluntary; the fact that he cannot do otherwise is beside the point. But 
were he to change his mind and decide to leave, then his remaining would no 
longer be voluntary. In that case, and only in that case, would he be remaining 
only because he has no options. 
In order for this version of the liberty objection to cut any ice, it would need 
to be the case that most people who remain within a state do so only because 
they have no options.13 But is this really the case? No, it isn’t, at least not within 
 
11 Cf. Rousseau (1762: 4.2, n1): “This [i.e., that residence implies consent] should 
always be understood of a free state; for else family, goods, lack of refuge, 
necessity, [or] violence can keep an inhabitant in a country in spite of himself 
[malgré lui]; and then his merely staying does not imply his consent to the 
contract or to the violation of the contract” (emphasis mine). 
12 For a similar appropriation of Locke’s example, see Otsuka (2003: 106–7). 
13 Cf. Beran (1983: 494–495): “[I]t is not a criterion of the success of a theory of 
political authority that it assert principles according to which a government 
stands in an authority relation to every adult within its borders. Consent theory 
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most liberal democracies. Consider as a representative example the United 
States. Is it true that most people who live in this country do so only (or even 
primarily) because they have no readily accessible alternatives? Surely not. True, 
there are some people living here who never wanted to be here, and who would 
prefer to leave and would leave if given the opportunity, but who for one reason 
or another are unable to do so. I readily grant that such people do not consent 
through their residence, though of course they may have consented in some 
other way, such as by taking an oath. But such people would seem to represent 
a very small minority of the total population, probably less than ten percent. It 
would appear that the vast majority of people living in this country genuinely 
want to be here, and remain here at least in part, if not in whole, because they 
want to be here, and not just because they cannot leave.14 Most Americans, I 
suspect, would decline to emigrate to another country or even to some 
libertarian paradise in another part of the world, even if the respective 
governments made this a ready possibility, because most of them genuinely 
want to be here, whether out of nationalistic loyalty, a deep connection to place 
or people or culture, or even just inertia. To borrow a phrase from Otsuka (2003: 
107), they find being here “positively attractive in absolute terms” and not just 
attractive relative to one or more even worse alternatives. They are thus not like 
the person who takes refuge in a tree in order to escape the raging flood waters 
below (Otsuka 2003: 106). Such a person admittedly chooses to climb the tree 
not because she finds that choice attractive in its own right, but because she 
considers the alternative even worse. Her decision to scale the tree is made 
under duress, and for that reason is insufficiently voluntary to qualify as a 
consenting act. In contrast, most citizens of a liberal democracy do not remain 
within the state under duress; for the high cost of the alternative is irrelevant to 
their desire to remain. They find the idea of remaining attractive in its own right, 
not just relative to an even worse alternative: they are not here in spite of 
themselves, as Rousseau (1762: 4.2, n1) puts it, but in accord with themselves. 
The fact that they lack a good alternative cannot therefore be a good reason for 
considering their residence involuntary. 
Simmons’ other suggestion is that our remaining often fails to be voluntary 
because in treating residence as a consenting act in the absence of viable 
options, the state exploits our vulnerability. We may illustrate the situation as 
follows. Suppose I come across a person in dire straits, and realizing that she has 
 
is tenable as long as it is possible to create states in which the vast majority of 
residents can stand in a political authority relation to the state, which is based on 
their consent.” 
14 Note that I am not suggesting that most residents willingly accept the authority 
of the state, only that they willingly remain within the state. The issue here is not 
their attitude toward the state, but whether their remaining is voluntary. Cf. 
Simmons (1993: 246). 
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no options for escape, I offer her a way out on the condition that she participate 
in my criminal enterprise. If she accepts my offer in order to avoid the 
alternative—death, let us say—we might well think that she did not do so 
voluntarily—that she had no choice, as we say—and thus that she is not culpable 
for her criminal activities, because she was the victim of exploitation. Similarly, a 
state that treats our residence as a consenting act when we have no choice but 
to be here, the thought goes, exploits our vulnerability and thus renders our 
residence involuntary. 
As to the general principle here, I readily grant that if one person exploits 
another’s lack of options in order to compel or pressure the latter to do 
something that they would not otherwise do—that they do not want to do, in 
other words—then the situation is exploitative and the latter person cannot be 
considered to have acted voluntarily. But the key here is that the person is being 
forced to do something against her will. Consider again the locked room. If the 
man wants to leave, then it would be fair to say that the one who put him there 
and locked the door has exploited his vulnerability and that the man’s remaining 
is thus not voluntary. But if the man genuinely wants to be there, if he would have 
entered the room of his own volition in order to meet his friend, if he would have 
stayed in the room even if the door were unlocked, then can we really consider 
the circumstances exploitative? Can we really say that the man stays there 
involuntarily? I hardly think so, and Simmons himself concedes as much. So 
whether this point succeeds as an objection to the residence theory depends on 
whether, or rather on the extent to which, the residents within a state genuinely 
want to be there. And as I have already noted, it seems that the vast majority of 
residents in liberal democracies such as the United States genuinely want to be 
there. Their situation is much like that of the man in the locked room, who finds 
himself put there without his prior consent but nonetheless prefers staying to 
leaving because of the desirable conditions. Though we might grant that the few 
who prefer to be elsewhere do not remain voluntarily and are even the victims 
of an exploitative situation, in the vast majority of cases one’s residence can be 
considered just as voluntary as the man’s remaining in the room. The liberty 
objection thus still falls short. 
One further worry remains. I have suggested that one’s remaining is 
voluntary just in case one wants to remain. But suppose that one’s wants are the 
result of some kind of extreme manipulation, such as brainwashing or 
oppressive conditioning. In such cases, it would seem that a person may still fail 
to act voluntarily even when she does what she wants. Thus if the man had not 
only been placed in the locked room but brainwashed into thinking that he 
wanted to be there, then we would not consider his remaining voluntary, even 
though he might insist otherwise. Similarly, it might be thought that residence 
cannot be considered voluntary even if most residents want to be in that state, 
because their wanting to be there results from some such manipulation, perhaps 
by the state. 
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Once again I readily admit the general principle: if a person’s desires are the 
result of this kind of extreme manipulation, then that person is not free even 
when she does what she wants. But once again I question its relevance. For few 
if any residents in present-day liberal democracies seem to be the victims of such 
manipulation, at least with respect to their attitudes toward the state. To be sure, 
many people are conditioned to be patriotic and nationalistic, and perhaps even 
to think that their home country is superior to others. As children, we are taught 
to pledge allegiance to the flag, to sing the national anthem, to revere our 
founding documents, to celebrate national holidays, and so forth. But this falls 
well short of the kind of manipulation that robs one of freedom. The 
characteristic feature of this kind of manipulation, I would suggest, is that it 
bypasses, short-circuits, or overrides a person’s rational faculty, thus leaving the 
person insufficiently sensitive to relevant reasons.15 For instance, if oppressive 
conditioning left a person insensitive to the oppressiveness of a regime as a 
reason for fleeing, then that person’s remaining could not be considered 
voluntary, even if she wanted to remain. But the kind of nationalistic conditioning 
that we often see in liberal democracies does not go this far; it does not 
circumvent people’s rational faculties in a way that leaves them insufficiently 
sensitive to relevant reasons. So while this might be a problem for the residence 
theory as applied to oppressive dictatorships, it is not a problem for the theory 
as applied to liberal democracies such as the United States. 
In view of all this, I conclude that the liberty objection fails. In its basic form, 
it falls flat because it tacitly assumes a highly controverted principle about 
freedom and the ability to do otherwise. In its more nuanced forms, it fails 
because in modern liberal democracies, a person’s residence typically fails to 
satisfy any of the cited freedom-defeating conditions: it is neither forced, nor 
exploitative, nor manipulated. As long as we grant that voluntary action does not 
require the ability to do otherwise, then, it seems that the residence theory does 
succeed in establishing that such democracies have legitimate, consent-based 




Critics of the residence theory typically reject that theory on the ground that a 
person’s remaining within the bounds of a state generally fails to satisfy one or 
 
15 For developments of this sort of approach, see Wolf (1990), Fischer and 
Ravizza (1998), and Fischer (2004). 
16 Here I part company with those (actual) consent theorists, such as Walzer 
(1970: 99–119), Beran (1977; 1983; 1987), and Boxill (1993), who hold that 
current states must be reformed in some way before they can claim to have 
legitimate, consent-based authority over their residents. 
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more of the three conditions of consent discussed here, namely, the intention, 
knowledge, and liberty conditions. Against this, I have argued that there is no 
general requirement of intention for consent. Consent does not require that one 
intend either to consent or to communicate consent, and when consent is given 
passively, as in the case of continued residence, one need not even intend the 
inaction. Further, I have argued that the knowledge condition requires only that 
there be a reasonable expectation that one would know that and to what they 
are consenting, and that this condition, so understood, is widely satisfied: most 
adult residents of modern, liberal democracies know, or at least could 
reasonably be expected to know, that in remaining they are consenting to the 
lawful actions of the government. Finally, I have argued that the liberty condition 
is also widely satisfied in such democracies, at least if freedom is compatible 
with the inability to do otherwise, as many philosophers believe. In short, none 
of the conditions of consent, properly understood, clearly fails to be satisfied in 
a wide range of cases. 
I have here sought only to defend the residence theory against the most 
common objections. Perhaps better ones can be produced, but it is hard to see 
how the usual objections can be considered a success. Despite their popularity, 
they are far from conclusive or even probably sound. If the critics want to refute 
the residence theory, they need to do better. As things stand, we have been 
given no good reason to doubt that a great many residents of liberal 
democracies have in fact consented to the lawful actions of the state in virtue of 
their continued residence within its boundaries, apart perhaps from the 
controversial doctrine that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise. At least 
for those who reject this doctrine, the residence theory remains a viable option. 
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